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Modeling Time-Pressured Risky Decision-Making
Dr. Joshua B. Hurwitz
Air Force Research Laboratory
Human Effectiveness Directorate
Abstract
This paper describes a model, called Decision-Making under Risk In a Vehicular Environment (DRIVE), that
simulates the trade-off between two strategies for achieving a goal in real time: 1) Responding quickly to meet
a deadline and 2) delaying responses to better evaluate risks.  DRIVE is used to predict the performance of
an automobile driver waiting to cross an intersection as a car approaches from the cross street.  In this task,
the driver is punished for crashing into the oncoming car, but is also put under pressure to cross quickly.
Results show a relationship between risk-taking on the intersection-crossing task and external measures of
risk taking, including driving history and participation in risky activities.  DRIVE model fits indicate that
individual differences on this task can be accounted for by varying the decision-making parameters in the
model, rather than the perceptual parameters.
Introduction
One of the hallmarks of time-pressured risky tasks is that decision-makers often face a tradeoff between quickly achieving
a goal to gain some reward or delaying a response to avoid a potential loss.  In these situations, a rapid response may be desirable
if a delay reduces potential payoffs, whereas a delayed response may allow more time to process risk information.  For example,
if there is pressure to quickly reach a destination, an automobile driver crossing an intersection might decide to cross in front
of an oncoming car rather than wait for that car to cross first.  On the other hand, the driver might wait to better estimate of its
arrival time at the intersection.
On tasks such as these, the processes underlying performance could be divided into two categories: risk perception and
acceptance.  Risk perception refers to mechanisms such as time estimation that underlie evaluation of the hazards inherent in
an activity, whereas risk acceptance refers to the decision to execute a response in light of that evaluation. Researchers generally
favor the idea that individual differences in risk acceptance underlie real-time risk taking (e,g, Wilde,  Claxton-Oldfield, &
Platenius, 1985). However, in many situations, a logical argument could be made for either component. In the example above,
the driver could 1) overestimate the oncoming car’s time to arrival and therefore cross first, or 2) accurately estimate arrival time,
but accept the risk and decide to cross first anyway.
The DRIVE Model. In order to evaluate whether risk perception or acceptance contribute to risk taking, a model was
developed that incorporates both perceptual and decisional mechanisms for making risky decisions on the crossing task.  This
model, Decision Making under Risk in a Vehicular Environment, or DRIVE, uses non-linear perceptual functions to estimate
the oncoming car’s speed and distance, as well as the time it will take for the crossing driver to reach the path of the oncoming
car (Hurwitz, 1996).  Free parameters in these functions determine how sensitive the model is to the true speeds, distances and
times.
Using these estimates, DRIVE continuously evaluates the oncoming car’s projected distance from the intersection.  The
projected distance, Dt, is the model’s prediction of how far the oncoming car will be from the intersection when 1) a crossing
response is initiated at time t and 2) the crossing car reaches the path of the oncoming car.  Once Dt is calculated, DRIVE’s
decision-making mechanism determines how much it affects crossing probabilities.
In the decision-making mechanism, the probability of initiating the crossing response at time t, P(Rt),  is an exponential
function of Dt, so that




This function is similar to the exponential generalization gradient that Shepard (1987) has used to account for performance on
perceptual discrimination tasks.  The free parameter, c (c $ 0), determines the degree to which the model’s evaluation of risk,
as represented by Dt, affects its probability of crossing.  For example, if c = 0, then DRIVE predicts that the driver will never
cross the intersection, so the value of the projected distance is irrelevant. For larger values of c, the model gets increasingly
"risky", avoiding crossing only given smaller projected distances.  For c _ 4, DRIVE predicts that a driver will avoid crossing
only when Dt = 0. 
Objective. The critical question was whether differences among risk groups could be accounted for by DRIVE’s perceptual
or decision-making mechanisms. To address this question, high- and low-risk drivers were identified based on external measures
of risk taking, such as driving history and participation in risky activities.  DRIVE was then fitted to these drivers’ response data
from a simulated intersection-crossing task.  The results were analyzed to determine how much the fit improved when some of
the model’s free parameters were varied across groups whereas others remained fixed.
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Using this method, the risk-perception hypothesis would be supported if DRIVE’s perceptual-processing mechanisms
significantly account for differences across groups.  However, the risk-acceptance hypothesis would be supported if the c
parameter, which is associated with DRIVE’s decision-making function, best accounts for these differences.  For example,
consider the case in which the values of the risk-perception parameters in DRIVE (i.e. those that regulate sensitivity to speed,
time and distance) vary across groups.  If allowing these parameter values to vary in this way significantly improves the fit of
the model, compared to keeping them fixed across groups, then this would provide evidence that group differences in risk taking
are due to differences in risk perception.  On the other hand, if varying the value of the c parameter (i.e. the free parameter for
the decision mechanism) across groups significantly improves the fit compared to keeping its value fixed, then this would provide
evidence that individual differences in risk acceptance best account for group differences.  In other words, if the best-fitting
version of DRIVE assumes that there are group differences in the decision-making parameter but no differences in perceptual
parameters, then this would provide evidence that both high- and low-risk individuals process risk information similarly, but
have different levels of risk acceptance.
Method
Subjects.  Subjects were 122 drivers, 79 males and 43 females, living in the Chicago metropolitan area. All were paid a
minimum of $30 for participating in this study, plus up to $10 more depending upon their performance.  They ranged in age from
16 to 67 years, with a mean of 32.8 and a median of 29.5 (s.d. = 11.8).  Most (91) had been convicted of at least one moving
traffic violation in 1996.
Procedure. Subjects were instructed that they were playing the role of a driver waiting to cross an intersection as a car
approached from the cross street, and that they could cross at any time by pressing a button on the joystick.  They were then
given 256 trials, each of which presented a 3D scene of the oncoming car shown from the crossing driver’s point of view.  The
trials varied in 1) the oncoming car’s starting distance (250N or 500N from the intersection), 2) the time available to cross in front
of that car (0, 400, 900 and 2100 ms.), and 3) the time it took for the crossing car to cross the intersection (4 or 8 secs.).
Time pressure was implemented in this task by displaying a digital timer at the bottom of the screen.  On each trial, the timer
started at some value between about 3125 and 11500, and decreased at a rate such that it reached 0 by the end of the trial.  The
starting value depended on the conditions, and incorporated a random component to prevent the timer from acting as a cue on
when to respond.  When a successful crossing occurred, the subject received the number of points on the timer when the crossing
was initiated, and when a crash occurred, the subject lost four times the initial value on the timer.  Subjects earning more points
were given more money at the end of the study.
Covariate tests.  Besides the crossing task, subjects were also presented with tasks and questionnaires that measured risk
perception and acceptance.  One measure of risk perception was a velocity estimation task.  This task was just like the crossing
task, except subjects used the joystick to continuously judge the speed of the oncoming car.  Accuracy was estimated using the
slope of the regression line relating the estimated and true velocities.
Measures of risk acceptance included two questionnaires on risky activities, a sensation-seeking questionnaire (Heino, van
der Molen & Wilde, 1996), a driving history questionnaire and a driver opinion survey (Wark, 1992).  One risky-activities
questionnaire asked how often subjects participated in high- and low-risk activities, including dangerous outdoors activities,
racing activities and risky financial activities.  The second asked subjects to rate the riskiness of these activities.  The sensation-
seeking questionnaire asked about preferences for engaging in highly stimulating activities.  The driver history questionnaire
asked subjects about their history of accidents and violations, as well as how long they had been driving and how much driving
they do.  The Driver Opinion Survey asked subjects their beliefs about various driving activities, such as racing other vehicles
and speeding, and about traffic law enforcement, driver training, and drinking and driving.
Results
Risk groups were derived from factor scores obtained from a Principle Components Analysis of the covariate tests.  This
PCA was constrained to have a two-factor solution.  In the results, lower age, preference for racing in the driver opinion survey,
sensation-seeking tendency, velocity-estimation ability, and tendency to engage in risky outdoor activities loaded most strongly
on the first factor, which was called the risk-taking factor.  Higher numbers of accidents, violations, and miles-per-week driven
in the previous 5 years loaded most strongly on the second factor, which was called the driver risk-taking factor.  Given these
results and the small number of females, four groups of males were defined based on a median split of the risk-taking and driver
risk-taking factor scores, and two groups of females were defined based on a median split of the driver risk-taking factor.
The data for the model fits was each group’s cumulative crossing probability at 100-ms increments in each condition.  For
example, consider the condition in which the oncoming car approaches from 500 feet away, the subject is given a fast car (i.e.
one that crosses the intersection in 4 sec) and there is no opportunity to cross in front of the oncoming car.  The trials in this
condition were divided into 100-ms time steps, and, for each group, a cumulative crossing probability of having crossed was
computed for every time step.  This same probability function was computed for the other 15 conditions as well.
DRIVE was fitted to this data using a hill-climbing search to obtain the best parameter estimates.  The fit criterion was the
weighted sum of squared deviations between observed and predicted values. There were 7 free parameters in the model: 3 for
sensitivity to velocity, 2 for sensitivity to time, 1 for sensitivity to distance, and 1 (the c parameter) for decision-making.  The
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first search, called s0, assumed that all groups had the same values for all of the parameters.  Then, 7 searches were done, each
of which had 1 parameter varying across the groups, while the others remained fixed at the estimates derived from search s0.
A final search, s7, was also performed in which all 7 parameters varied across groups.  
Model Fits.  Several criteria were used to establish which variants of DRIVE fit best.  The best-fitting model was considered
the one that produced the lowest sum of squares and the highest correlation between observed and predicted values.  The fit of
such a model also would not significantly differ from the fit of s7, the version of DRIVE in which all parameters varied across
all groups.  Finally, the fit of the best-fitting model would significantly differ from the fit of s0, the version in which all parameter
values were the same across all groups.
Results (see Table 1) show that the best-fitting version of DRIVE was the one in which the c parameter for the decision-
making mechanism varied across groups.  Estimates for this parameter showed that, in general, the projected distance at which
high-risk drivers stopped responding was smaller than the one at which low-risk drivers stopped responding.  The fact that all
estimates were held constant across groups except the one for the decision-making parameter (c) suggests that all subjects had
equal abilities to compute the projected distances.  However, when faced with smaller projected distances, high-risk subjects
attempted a crossing anyway.
Table 1.  Comparison of the Model Fits Assuming That a Parameter for One Mechanism

















































While this test and the DRIVE model have obvious applications to driving, they also have more general relevance to many
time-stressed decision-making tasks.  These include tasks in which 1) risks fluctuate over time, 2) there is some reward for
responding rapidly, but 3) the decision-maker must determine at each moment whether sufficient information has accumulated
to make a risky response at that time.  For example, strategic decision-makers in the Air Force often need to decide when to
allocate aircraft to engagements despite having limited information about enemy strengths and positions.  Opportunities may
arise to attack enemy positions, but any delays to gather more information could allow the enemy sufficient time to eliminate
these opportunities.  On the other hand, not having sufficient intelligence about an adversary could be hazardous since it might
place friendly aircrews at risk.  The success or failure of these types of decisions could have a major impact on the execution
of a larger engagement.  Thus, understanding how these decisions are made could help in modeling how faulty decision-makers
influence major conflicts.
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